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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AS POLITICAL LAW
MARK TUSHNET*

INTRODUCTION

This Article addresses some of the critical reviews of The People
Themselves, focusing on how they respond to the proposition, which I believe to be correct and made in The People Themselves, that constitutional
law is a distinctive or special kind of law. I call that kind of law political
law. 1 Both parts of the formulation are equally important. Constitutional
law is law, what is sometimes described as "hard" law. 2 As law, it sometimes induces decision-makers to make decisions that are inconsistent with
their "pure" preferences, that is, those they would hold in the absence of
law. My aim is primarily to clarify some methodological issues connected
to the idea of constitutional law as political law, rather than to make a substantive contribution to the analysis. I observe at the outset, though, that I
substantially agree with Kramer's contention that we can find in U.S. history a persistent strain of popular constitutionalism-that is, as I understand
the point, the deployment of constitutional arguments by the people themselves, independent of, and sometimes in acknowledged conflict with, constitutional interpretations offered and enforced by the courts. After setting
out some general methodological considerations, I briefly discuss the way
in which popular constitutionalism is continuous with, albeit distinct from,
more standard descriptions of constitutional law, as involving a dialogue
between the courts and the people. I conclude with an examination of some
consequentialist criticisms of popular constitutionalism, that is, the claim
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.

1. Kramer's term, drawn from John Phillip Reid, is "political-legal." See
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

LARRY KRAMER, THE

24, 63 (2004). Robert

Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1027, 1037-38 (2004) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism], articulate the
distinction as one between constitutional law, a term they reserve for "the judgments and opinions of
courts," and the Constitution, a term they say refers to "the fundamental beliefs of 'We the People."' I
believe that Kramer's terminology, and my own, is more illuminating because it does not attempt to
draft conventional terminology into new service.
2. See generally Symposium, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 19 (1989) (addressing the question, Is the
Constitution law?). See also Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 1034-37 (discussing "The Constitution as Law"), 1039 (asserting that "the Constitution has features of ordinary
law").
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that the people themselves have in fact done quite badly in interpreting the
Constitution, as compared to the courts. Here I return to some methodological considerations, as the basis for arguing that the case for popular
constitutionalism is stronger than its consequentialist critics suggest.
I.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

That constitutional law is to some substantial degree law used to be
entirely uncontroversial, and we therefore have a reasonably good sense of
how to think about the "law" part of constitutional law. That constitutional
law is to some substantial degree political is now largely uncontroversial, 3
but many efforts to analyze the "political" part of constitutional law strike
me as simplistic, at least in that they treat constitutional law as only politics, and understand politics to be the expression of unanalyzable preferences. 4 I take The People Themselves to be a sustained attempt to provide a
rich body of historical information that provides the basis for thinking more
deeply about the way in which constitutional law combines politics and
law. 5
How-definitionally--can we distinguish between the legal and the
political components of constitutional law? One of the points I make in this
Article is that we cannot expect sharp analytic distinctions to be available
when our interest is in the actual practice of constitutional law throughout
U.S. history. Still, I can offer some suggestions to orient thinking, to get us
in the general area where we ought to be. So, for example, as law, constitutional law's primary characteristic is that it is to a large degree retrospective: Decision-makers today look to decisions made yesterday, whether
evidenced by the Constitution's text or by judicial precedents, for guidance
3. I note, though, that I take a central element in the criticisms of The People Themselves offered
by Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594
(2005) (book review) [hereinafter Alexander & Solum, Popular Constitutionalism],to be the insistence,
in my view mistaken, that constitutional law is only law, indistinguishable from common or statutory
law.
4. For a recent dramatic example, see Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 TermForward:A PoliticalCourt, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005).
5. 1 believe that European constitutional thought, influenced by Hans Kelsen, could be usefully
consulted in understanding U.S. constitutional law. Kelsen designed the Austrian constitutional court,
the major institutional alternative to the U.S. model for a court exercising the power of judicial review,
as he did, precisely because he understood constitutional law to be a special kind of law, in which the
political played a large role. He believed, I think mistakenly, that it followed from his understanding of
constitutional law as political law that constitutional courts could act only as what he called negative
legislators. For a discussion of Kelsen's constitutional theorizing, stressing the role of the constitutional
court as a negative legislator, see Bojan Bugaric, Courts as Policy-Makers: Lessonsfrom Transition, 42
HARV. INT'L L.J. 247, 256-57 (2001). 1 think it would be quite helpful, though I am not the person to do
it, to develop a way of thinking about constitutional law as political law that would meld Kelsen's
insights with the lessons of the U.S. experience with constitutional review.
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and constraint. This retrospective character makes legal analysis an exercise in interpretation--of texts, of practices, of history. In contrast, politics
is to a large degree prospective: Decision-makers today make judgments
about what would be best for the society going forward, without essential
reference to prior events or practices.
The inevitable fuzziness of the distinction between the legal and political components of constitutional law should be immediately apparent
from these suggestions. 6 For example, sensible decision-makers contemplating what would be best for society in the future will often, perhaps always, consult their understanding of what policies had worked well and
poorly in the past, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly (as when
they think of large analogies such as "Munich" in trying to figure out how
to deal with dictators). Still, politics can involve decisions that are entirely
forward-looking. 7 Additionally, sometimes retrospective examination-that
is, interpreting the law as it is-involves assessing the consequences that
we think would follow from finding the law to be X rather than Y.
More interesting, and more directly related to Kramer's work, the
people acting politically sometimes (though not always) engage in an interpretive enterprise as well. Our political actions are sometimes efforts to
understand who we are as a people, that is, who we have constituted ourselves to be through our history. A dramatic recent example is the debate
over the adoption of torture and closely related techniques of interrogation
as a method to extract information about threats to national security. An
important component of the arguments made by those proposing a statute
to ban further use of such techniques was that their use was a betrayal of
who we were as Americans. 8 I take this argument to be one about constitu6. I note that an important element in some of the critical reviews of The People Themselves is a
demand for more precision than is appropriate for the subject matter. See Alexander & Solum, Popular
Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 1602-07 (2005) (describing the authors' "conceptual toolkit").
Alexander and Solum's use of the phrase "cash out," id. at 1607, is a strong signal of their interest in
greater conceptual precision than seems to me appropriate. See also id. at 1596 (describing popular
constitutionalism "before the Constitution [as] something cloudy-diffuse, unclear, and ambiguous"),
1618-19 ("[F]loating in a rarified atmosphere at the very highest level of abstraction, popular constitutionalism is thin and wispy."); Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its Discontents, 20 CONST.
COMMENT. 405, 432 (2003) ("I am unclear precisely what it means."). I note that there is some tension
between a description of Kramer's work as abstract and the obvious historical detail with which it is
filled.
7. Cf Abraham Lincoln, Second Annual Message to Congress, (Dec. 1, 1862), in 5 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 518, 537 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) ("As our case is new, so we must
think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.").
8. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Senator John McCain, McCain Statement on Detainee Amendments
(Oct.
5,
2005),
available at
http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm? fuseaction=
Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&Contentid=1611 ("The enemy we fight has no respect for human life
or human rights. They don't deserve our sympathy. But this isn't about who they are. This is about who
we are. These are the values that distinguish us from our enemies.").
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tional law in the context of prospective decision-making. Interpretation, the
legal component of constitutional law as political law, is here inextricable
from the forward-looking, political component of constitutional law as
political law.
As I have said, these comments are aimed simply at getting us in
roughly the right area to think about constitutional law as political law.
How can we engage in a closer examination of that idea? In my interpretation of his work, Kramer answers, By looking at history. People perform
constitutional law as political law through (some of) their mobilizations in
politics.
To begin with, we must examine some narrow points about using history to examine constitutional law as political law. Not all popular mobilizations are performances of constitutional law, although many, perhaps
most, are. Kramer does not develop criteria for distinguishing between
those that are and those that are not. Nor are crisp criteria likely to be available. My own sense is that Madison's metaphor about momentary conflagrations that flare up in a single state but do not spread throughout the
extended republic captures much of what is involved, 9 but it would take
detailed examination of particular incidents to begin to get a better sense of
the distinction. 10
As Kramer properly emphasizes, popular mobilizations that are performances of constitutional law are not necessarily unmediated by standard
political organizations. I In some eras, the people organize themselves "out
of doors," in street demonstrations and the like, although even these mobilizations always have some sort of organizational basis. 12 Ordinarily,
9. THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) ("The influence of
factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general
conflagration through the other States.").
10. L. A. Powe, Jr., Are "the People" Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 855, 866-84 (2005) (book review) [hereinafter Powe, Missing in Action], describes a number of
candidates for popular mobilizations: massive resistance to desegregation, domestic anti-Communism
and McCarthyism, Richard Nixon's law-and-order campaign, advocacy of restoring school prayer, antibusing agitation, anti-abortion protest, and anti-globalization. Of these, massive resistance, anti-busing,
and anti-abortion protest pretty clearly count as popular mobilizations. The others are, in my view, more
ambiguous. See also infra text accompanying note 14.
11. But cf Alexander & Solum, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 1600 ("Kramer's
historical examples and list of political checks... include no mention of direct popular action.").
12. I am not a close student of these mobilizations, but I do recall reading Leonard Richards's
study of Jacksonian "riots" and being impressed by the degree of organization underlying them. See
LEONARD L. RICHARDS, "GENTLEMEN OF PROPERTY AND STANDING": ANTI-ABOLITION MOBS IN

JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1970); see also RICHARD D. BROWN, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS IN
MASSACHUSETTS: THE BOSTON COMMITTEE OF CORRESPONDENCE AND THE TOWNS, 1772-1774, at
38-91 (Norton Library 1976) (1970) (describing the extensive, quasi-governmental role of the Committees of Correspondence prior to the American Revolution). I think it worth noting that Alexander and
Solum seem to me almost obsessively concerned with the image of unruly mobs, which probably is
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though, as Kramer repeatedly emphasizes, popular mobilization takes place
through the ordinary forms of political organization, and especially through
13
political parties and their leaders.
This fact, however, introduces yet another complication: We have to
worry about simulacra of popular mobilization, that is, about assertions by
political leaders that they are acting in the service of the people themselves
when in fact the political leaders are pursuing their own agendas. Examining particular incidents in detail seems to be the only effective analytic
strategy, but-simply to suggest what we might want to look at-consider
the advocacy by political leaders of constitutional amendments to authorize
organized prayer in public schools or to immunize from constitutional attack legislation banning flag-burning as a means of political protest. In both
cases the leaders claim, with some support from polling data, that a large
portion of the public would like such amendments to the Constitution, and
yet the consistent rejection of such amendments, and the fact that no one
seems to suffer political damage from opposing the amendments, suggests
that there is no underlying popular mobilization in those cases. I doubt that
we are ever going to substitute crisp analytic categories, or "markers," as
Scot Powe asks for,14 for historical judgment on this and related ques5
tions. 1
As I have said, scholars are familiar with how political law-that is,
constitutional law-is law. Kramer's primary goal is to delineate the politilinked, as well, to their reference to interpretive anarchy. For references to mobs, see Alexander &
Solum, PopularConstitutionalism,supra note 3 at 1622 (providing five reasons why "mobs... cannot
do the job required by robust popular constitutionalism"), 1636 (while acknowledging that Whig mobs
were "polite," nonetheless asserting that "mob rule has a tragic history"). See also Powe, Missing in
Action, supra note 10, at 893 (referring to "mass meetings" as the institutionalization of popular mobilizations).
13. Alexander & Solum overlook this feature of Kramer's account. See, e.g., Alexander & Solum,
Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 1635 (asserting that popular action wherein "the people
would act through government institutions... would erase the distinction between popular constitutionalism and executive or legislative supremacy"); see also id. at 1621 ("[A]n authoritative interpretation that binds government officials.., requires an institutional mechanism by which the multiple
voices of popular opinion can be translated into a single voice of interpretive authority."). On Kramer's
account, specific controversies are resolved by a complex process of institutional interaction, sufficient
to satisfy the conceptual requirement Alexander and Solum impose. The difference between them and
Kramer, it seems to me, is that they fail to explain why their conceptual requirement is for a single
institutional mechanism operating identically across all historical periods.
14. Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 892 (after enumerating some public officials who
may have been speaking for popular mobilizations, commenting, "Perhaps they all were; perhaps none
of them were. But it would be nice to have a marker to know.").
15. Powe discusses efforts to restore organized prayer to the public schools, but provides almost
no evidence that this was a popular rather than a politicians' movement. The one datum he does provide-that according to a work published in 1971, "[t]wo-thirds of all Southern schools continued
exactly as before," id. at 876-is outdated and, in the absence of some indication of what percentage of
students in Southern schools attended those schools, does not shed much light on the question of popular support for pro-prayer initiatives. Id. at 875-77.
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cal component of political law. It is important to his effort that we avoid
treating politics as mere preference. To use Bruce Ackerman's terminology, normal politics involves arguments about which of our preferences
ought to be converted into public policy. 16 The politics in political law is
different, and not, as in Ackerman's scheme, because of the greater normative weight that attaches to what the people are concerned with during constitutional moments. 17 It is different because it typically has a different
rhetoric from normal politics, even though it takes the same form that normal politics does.
When popular mobilizations are mediated by political institutions, as
they usually are, that form of mobilization is one of interaction among legislatures, the President and -other executive officials, and the courts, over
matters they all treat as being of constitutional significance. What matters
to Kramer is that in these interactions, unlike those of normal politics, the
legislative and executive participants clearly assert their equality with the
courts on questions of constitutional interpretation. Interactions among the
branches occur in normal politics, but Congress and the President accept
that the courts have the last word in interpreting the law, that is, in the retrospective enterprise. 18 What makes constitutional law as political law
different is that the legislative and executive participants explicitly insist
that the courts' view of what the existing Constitution means has no special
weight as law, but only the value that attaches to that view as a rational
matter. Here the legislative and executive participants take the position that
they too are entitled to engage in the retrospective enterprise of interpreting
the Constitution, often because of the way in which the Constitution expresses who we are as a nation.
The fact that constitutional law as political law can be performed
through interactions among the branches of government contributes to the
inherent fuzziness of the category popularconstitutionalism. Those interactions are structured to some extent. For example, the "case or controversy"
requirement of Article III means that courts are rarely-though not never16. See I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 230-65(1991).
17. For one thing, in Kramer's view (and mine), popular mobilizations are a more pervasive
phenomenon than Ackerman's metaphor of constitutional moments suggests (although in practice
Ackerman may be so profligate in identifying constitutional moments and near-moments that the difference between his view and mine may be quite small).
18. Of course, normal politics usually involves the adoption and interpretation of statutes, and
Congress and the President can revise a statute prospectively if they disagree with how the courts have
interpreted it. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (holding that Congress can modify the substantive provisions of a statute to thwart an anticipated judicial interpretation,
without violating the proscriptions of Article Ill). Compare Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S.
211 (1995) (holding that Article IIl precludes Congress from retrospectively reviving causes of action
previously barred by the expiration of the then-applicable statute of limitations).
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the first movers in the interactions. However, in general, the interactions
are fluid, and take different forms at different times. 19 That means that we
are not going to be able to make strong claims about the inherent structure
of constitutional law as political law, or even to be confident that we have
identified episodes of constitutional law as political law rather than normal
politics. 20 Ordinarily, I believe, all that we will be able to say is that at a
given time constitutional law as political law was performed by a given
kind of interaction between legislatures, Presidents, and courts, and at another time it was performed by another kind of interaction. 2 1 There can be
no claim that how it was performed at any particular time captures the essence of popular constitutionalism. In other words, the analysis of popular
22
constitutionalism is necessarily historical rather than conceptual.
II.

POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AS A FORM OF DIALOGIC
CONSTITUTIONALISM

Dialogic accounts of constitutional law treat the people, legislatures,
executives, and courts as in conversation. We can distinguish among dialogic accounts primarily by considering the time frame over which the
conversation occurs, and secondarily (but importantly for purposes of understanding popular constitutionalism) by considering who signals that the
conversation is over.

19. And, of course, Kramer's primary lament about the current period is that the people, and their
political leaders, appear to have abandoned the commitment he finds in U.S. history to constitutional
law as political law.
20. The strength and weakness of Ackerman's enterprise, I believe, lies in his effort to identify
formal criteria that do identify constitutional moments. For my comments on that effort, see MARK
TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 4(2003).
21. Kramer emphasizes this point in headings such as "Popular Constitutionalism, circa 1840."
KRAMER, supra note 1, at 196. In one sense, it is fair to say that Kramer does not describe "how [popular constitutionalism] is supposed to operate," Carpenter, supra note 6, at 432, but only because, on his
account, it is not "supposed" to operate in any particular way. Popular constitutionalism simply is the
interaction among the people, political leaders, and political institutions (including the courts) over
questions of constitutional meaning. I confess to having been unsuccessful in my efforts to persuade
constitutional lawyers that the political question doctrine is a doctrine of constitutional law qua law in
which the substance of constitutional law is simply the outcome of political contest. For one version of
my argument, see Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation
and Disappearanceof the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203 (2002).
22. I am puzzled by Alexander and Solum's assertion that normative claims cannot be founded on
an examination of historical experience unless that experience is refined into analytically precise terms.
See Alexander & Solum, PopularConstitutionalism,supra note 3, at 1617 (criticizing Kramer's "deliberate looseness" when coupled with his "normative agenda"). Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the
People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 660 (2005) (book review), in referring to Kramer's "historical
pragmatism," seems to me to have a better understanding of the relation between Kramer's historical
inquiry and his normative proposals.
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A standard political science model of the interaction between the Supreme Court and the political branches sees a dialogue occurring over a
relatively long time frame. Originating with Robert Dahl in 1957,23 and
updated by Barry Friedman and others, 24 this model has the Court being
brought into line with the constitutional views held by a political coalition
that sustains itself in power for a suitably long period. 2 5 The mechanism for
alignment is the appointment process: As older judges die or retire, they are
replaced by new ones who share the constitutional views of the dominant
political coalition. 26 Notably, in this model it is irrelevant whether the
dominant coalition opposes judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation or merely disagrees with the interpretations provided by a Court that it
does not (yet) control. In the end, the dominant coalition comes to live with
judicial supremacy because, once it has taken control of the Court, it then
finds the issue ofjudicial supremacy irrelevant.
Scholars who emphasize the role of social movements in shaping constitutional law, such as Robert Post and Reva Siegel, 27 offer a model in
which the conversation can take place over a shorter term than in the political scientists' model. 2 8 According to this view, the people influence constitutional law by organizing social movements that offer distinctive
constitutional visions, typically oppositional to the vision dominant in the
courts when the movements begin. Social movements influence constitutional law in two ways. One returns us to the political scientists' model:
The movements affect electoral politics, which in turn affects the composition of the courts. But, the social movement model offers an alternative

23. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National PolicyMaker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
24. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993); Barry
Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of JudicialReview, 72 U. CiN.
L. REV. 1257 (2004).
25. For Powe's endorsement of this model, see Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 890
("There is no time since the Civil War when a party won three consecutive presidential elections and
failed to gain a majority on the Court.").
26. Cf Alexander & Solum, PopularConstitutionalism,supra note 3, at 1618 (referring to the use
of "the political process to change [the Supreme Court's] composition if we feel it has gone too far
astray"); Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 885 (describing "judges" as the "instrument"
contemporary political parties hope to use to implement their constitutional visions).
27. Post & Siegel, PopularConstitutionalism,supra note 1, at 1029 n. 13, provide this list of their
work: Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword:Fashioningthe Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: PolicentricInterpretationof the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in ConstitutionalStruggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1470 (2004); Reva B. Siegel,
Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitutionfrom a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
297(2001).
28. Although it is not inherent in their model that it does.
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mechanism: Judges observing the social movement and its effects on society change their views about what the Constitution means. 29 Unlike the
political scientists' model, then, the social movement model does not depend on a change in the Court's composition for there to be a change in
constitutional interpretation. Like that model, though, the social movement
30
model understands the story to end when the courts come into line.
Bruce Ackerman has offered a model with an even shorter time frame.
Important to his account of constitutional transformation is the "switch in
time. ' 3 1 Facing a mobilized public, and its political leadership, the courts
abandon their previous interpretation of the Constitution and adopt the one
offered by their conversational partners (here, more like adversaries). The
interactions that produce the switch in time occur within a compressed time
period, which is of course consistent with Ackerman's metaphor of "moments," that is, short periods of time in which important political and constitutional developments take place. Unlike the social movements model,
here the mechanism of change is not persuasion but submission or fear that
failure to change will produce severe adverse consequences for the Court.
But, like that model, the conversation ends when the Court comes to agree
with its adversaries. For Ackerman, after the Court changes, a new period
of normal politics takes hold until the next constitutional moment.
Finally, we come to popular constitutionalism as a dialogic process.
Here the conversation takes place in real time, much as in Ackerman's
model. In popular constitutionalism, everyone-the mobilized people, their
political representatives, and the courts-offers up constitutional interpretations all at once. The interactions among these political actors, that is, their
conversation, produces constitutional law. What is distinctive about popular constitutionalism is that the courts have no normative priority in the
conversation. For popular constitutionalists, it simply does not matter
whether, or when, or how, the courts come to accept the constitutional interpretation offered by the people themselves. 3 2 Sometimes the conversa-

29. Cf. Alexander & Solum, Popular Constitutionalism,supra note 3, at 1626 (noting that "the
Supreme Court could pay attention to popular criticism of its decisions").
30. Cf. Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 866 ("Forcing the Court to change its mind,
either by convincing the Justices they erred or, more likely, by new appointments, would seem to be the
most likely mechanism through which the people could control constitutional law.") Note the identification here of constitutional law with adjudicated law.
31. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 18-20 (1998) (providing a "five-stage process" including the switch in time); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE
FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 265
(2005) (describing "a recurring institutional dynamic," including a switch in time).
32. Cf Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 1038 ("[T]he fundamental
constitutional beliefs of the American people are informed and sustained by the constitutional law
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tions will end with the legislature and executive, and the people, accepting
the judges' decisions. 33 But, sometimes the conversations will end with the
legislature or the executive going their own way, ignoring the imprecations
34
hurled at them by the courts and supporters of judicial supremacy.
This aspect of popular constitutionalism is likely to be unattractive to
those who think that there is some necessary connection between analytic
clarity and social stability. 3 5 As I have emphasized, popular constitutionalism does not offer crisp analytic categories that tell us what will happen
when the people, through their legislators, urge one constitutional interpretation, the President urges another, and the courts yet a third. So, the seeker
of analytic clarity will ask, Doesn't popular constitutionalism portend anarchy? 36 I have argued elsewhere that it does not, 37 because the "anarchy"
argument mistakenly conflates a lack of analytic clarity with social disorannounced by courts, just as that law is informed and sustained by the fundamental constitutional
beliefs of Americans.").
33. For this reason, the "populist tu quoque" offered by Alexander and Solum-that the people of
the United States at present have accepted judicial supremacy-is not inconsistent with popular constitutionalism. See Alexander & Solum, PopularConstitutionalism,supra note 3, at 1638. Post and Siegel
present a more defensible version of the point:
Americans have generally been committed both to judicially enforceable constitutional rights
and to the idea that the Constitution reflects the political self-conception of the nation. They
have understood that judicially enforceable rights play an important role in guaranteeing the
conditions of popular constitutionalism, and that popular constitutionalism plays an important
role in articulating the fundamental values that judicially enforceable rights function to instantiate.
Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism,supra note 1, at 1036-37. And, for my version, see Mark
Tushnet, Forms of JudicialReview as Expressions of ConstitutionalPatriotism,22 L. & PHIL. 353, 375
(2003) ("[T]he people of the United States seem both (a) committed to strong-form judicial review, and
(b) sufficiently self-governing to count as participants in a process of constitutional democracy.").
Kramer's discussion of "Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004," in KRAMER, supra note 1, at 227-48,
should be read as arguing that the commitment to judicial supremacy or strong-form judicial review is
historically contingent and perhaps historically anomalous. See also Hulsebosch, supra note 22 passim,
one of whose general themes is that Kramer underestimates the degree to which the American people
have historically been ambivalent about judicial supremacy, simultaneously committed to it and nervous about that commitment.
34. A popular constitutionalist might predict, and take some satisfaction in the fact, that the courts
will eventually come into line, for any of the reasons set out in the other models. But, that prediction is
not intrinsic to popular constitutionalism, which can tolerate long periods of judicial resistance to the
views offered by the mobilized people and their political leaders.
35. And, of course, to those-whose views I address in the next Section of this Article-who
think that the courts almost always offer better constitutional interpretations than the people themselves.
36. See Alexander & Solum, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 1610-11 ("Without a
mechanism to resolve the dispute .... boundary conflicts would.., undermine the Constitution's
ability to serve the rule-of-law functions of enabling peaceful dispute resolution .... Even worse, such
conflicts might degenerate into naked power struggles, raising the Hobbesian specter of social chaos."),
1613 (arguing that one version of popular constitutionalism's "underlying logic ... leads to anarchy").
Cf Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On ExtrajudicialConstitutionalInterpretation,110 HARV. L.
REv. 1359 passim (1997) (arguing that judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation is necessary to
avoid interpretive anarchy, which has undesirable social consequences in making people uncertain
about the legal rules that will govern their daily activities).
37. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 27-28 (1999).

20061

POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AS POLITICAL LA W

der. Political institutions keep on operating without difficulty across a wide
range of matters even as popular constitutionalism's conversations take
place on some (of course important) issues. People in organized societies
tolerate a fair amount of uncertainty on some questions as long as there is
sufficient stability on other matters. 3 8 Proponents of the "anarchy" argument would have to offer some evidence that anarchy actually occurs before their position would have some bite. Kramer's account of popular
constitutionalism in U.S. history strongly suggests that popular constitutionalism can exist with a fair amount of social stability. 3 9 Further, as I
have indicated, popular constitutionalism's conversations are not entirely
unstructured. They use the ordinary modes of political action, with which
people are familiar and which, therefore, do not leave people feeling as if
they are at sea in their daily lives.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM

Does popular constitutionalism portend real social anarchy, as distinguishing from conceptual messiness? One reason to think that it does not is
the history Kramer recounts-a history in which substantial segments of
the American public have been committed to popular constitutionalism,
and simultaneously one in which the nation's social disorders have hardly
been attributable to that commitment. Still, one could fairly have consequentialist concerns about popular constitutionalism: Even if the people
themselves did not regularly riot in the streets, might not their constitutional interpretations be systematically worse than those proffered by the
courts?
Answering that question obviously requires some systematic comparative analysis. Conducting such an analysis is difficult. Typically, what we
get are anecdotes about occasions-sometimes, more than a few occasions-on which one institution performed badly according to the author's
often unstated criteria of good performance. 40 With luck the author will
explain why some other institution performed well (again according to
38. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 107, quotes Thomas Jefferson's version of this point: "[w]e
have.., in more than one instance, seen the opinions of different departments in opposition to each
other, & no ill ensue."
39. For a historical study of a situation in which interpretive anarchy actually prevailed for a
while, see Theodore W. Ruger, "AQuestion Which Convulses a Nation ": The Early Republic's Greatest Debate About the JudicialReview Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826 (2004) (reviewing brief period in
Kentucky history during which the legislature was given unabashed supremacy with no meaningful
judicial review). I read Ruger as showing that interpretive anarchy did not produce any more day-to-day
social instability than was otherwise characteristic of the locality in which it occurred.
40. Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 866-84 (describing several episodes of arguable
popular constitutionalism), is exemplary.
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those criteria), or would have performed well had it been given the chance,
in the same circumstances. But, anecdotes, even several anecdotes, are not
enough. What we need is some systematic analysis of comparative institutional operation.
Here are some components of such an analysis. 4 1 First, we would have
to specify some time frame over which the analysis should occur. Institutions always operate imperfectly, and the timeline for imperfect operation
will differ across institutions even if the institutions are equally good (or
bad) overall. That means that it will usually be possible for an author to
find some time period in which her favored institution operated well according to her criteria and the alternative institution operated badly. Examining only that time period might be quite misleading. Consider, for
example, a ten-year period in which the Supreme Court does quite a good
job of advancing constitutional interests and Congress does a bad job.
Maybe we simply have identified an aberrational period. If we expanded
our analysis to consider the decades before and after that period, we might
find that Congress and the Court performed about equally well, or even that
Congress outperformed the Court.
Those interested in addressing proposals for constitutional reform
should aim for a forward-looking analysis. Such individuals would typically like to know how different institutions are likely to perform within
some time horizon they think appropriate (their life span, that of their children, and so forth). But, of course, the only basis they have for evaluating
likely future performance is past performance. Ad hoc choices of past time
periods are likely to be misleading, and we must also be alert to the possibility that institutions operate differently now from the way they did in the
42
past.
Second, we have to take account of all types of good and bad performance. A court can perform badly by invalidating a statute that it
"should have" upheld, or by failing to invalidate one that it should have
struck down. Popular mobilizations can perform badly by inducing political
leaders to introduce and enact bad statutes, or by failing to mobilize effec41. My approach is derived from that offered by Wojciech Sadurski, Judicial Review and the
Protection of ConstitutionalRights, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 275 (2002).

42. Cf Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 894-95 ("The fact that Americans used certain
institutions and procedures before the Civil War is hardly an argument for using them today. Neither the
times nor the Constitution is static."). For example, one might think that improvements in the technology of partisan gerrymandering and innovations in enforcing party discipline within the past decade
make it inappropriate to project into the future an evaluation of congressional performance based on its
behavior in the 1960s and 1970s. For a recent argument that such changes have indeed occurred, see
JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION AND THE EROSION
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2005).
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tively enough to induce those leaders to enact good statutes. I have argued
that evaluation of legislative capacity to interpret the Constitution should
focus on completed legislative actions and those examples, rare in U.S.
constitutional practice, 4 3 of constitutional provisiotis that impose affirmative duties on legislatures. 44 That assessment is unavailable with respect to
popular constitutionalism more broadly understood, because there is no
'45
obvious way of knowing when a popular mobilization is "completed.
Once again, judgment, rather than a measuring rod, is what we will need.
Third, we would have to specify what counts as advancing a constitutional value. 46 One manifestation of not specifying this is quite common
and often unnoticed. The failing takes the form of assuming that only those
values the Supreme Court takes seriously count as admissible in discussing
what the Constitution, properly interpreted, means. So, for example, the
author will compare what state legislatures did with respect to racial equality to what the Supreme Court did during some period, and what Congress
did with respect to free expression to what the Supreme Court did, and
more. This approach fails t o take into account the possibility that there
might be interpretations of constitutional provisions that the Supreme Court
does not admit into discussion. 47 One might, for example, believe that the
U.S. Constitution commits the nation to guaranteeing income security for
all even though that position has little purchase in contemporary adjudi-

43. Other constitutions do impose some duties on legislatures. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC art. 283 ("Unconstitutionality by Omission"), available at
http://www.portugal.gov.pt/Portal/EN/Portugal/SistemaPolitico/Constituicao/ constituicaop37.htm.
44. Mark Tushnet, Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and
Two Informal Case Studies, 50 DUKE L.J.1395 (2001).
45. That is, of course, unless one rejects the premises of popular constitutionalism and takes
judicial agreement with the people's constitutional interpretation as the index of a mobilization's completion.
46. For example, Powe's consequentialist conclusions rest on the values held by standard contemporary liberals in the United States. This comes through particularly clearly in his assumption that
popular mobilizations on issues of law and order and against the right to choose with respect to abortion
obviously count against the claims of popular constitutionalism. For his discussion of these mobilizations, see Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 874-75 (law and order), 881-83 (anti-abortion
rights). One might say that Powe "sees popular constitutionalism only when he [dis]approves of the
cause," id. at 887 (prefix in brackets added to quoted text; Powe was describing Larry Kramer).
47. This point differs from the related one, made familiar by Lawrence Sager, that some constitutional provisions are underenforced, in the sense that primary responsibility for advancing those values
lies outside the courts. For Sager's most recent explication, see LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN
PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 93-128 (2004). One important

feature of underenforced provisions, at least as I understand Sager's approach, is that the courts and
other institutions acknowledge that a constitutional value is at stake, but the courts refrain from fully
enforcing that value because of their institutional incapacities. Note that institutions other than the
courts will necessarily come out "better" in enforcing constitutional provisions when we consider
underenforced ones. My concern in the text above is with situations in which the courts do not acknowledge that a constitutional value is implicated.
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cated constitutional law. 4 8 One holding that view might rank the Supreme
Court's constitutional performance well below that of Congress.
At this point, my earlier observation that popular constitutionalism is,
as law, in part a retrospective effort to identify who we are as a nation becomes particularly important. Without here (or, I fear, elsewhere) providing
the kind of historical support that would be needed, I think it plausible to
contend that the people of the United States have taken on several deep
constitutional commitments, the most obvious of which are to income security and environmental protection. On this view, enacting the Social Security system and the Endangered Species Act were decisions about what the
Constitution, properly interpreted, requires. And yet, the courts have never
said that such statutes have constitutional dimensions. Taking the courts'
assertions about what our constitutional rights are as providing the criteria
for comparing how institutions perform will omit, by fiat alone, a comparison on the issues of income security and environmental protection.
Fourth, we have to compare institutional performance across the entire
range of (what we regard as) constitutional provisions. For example, we
might find that, in some time period, courts performed reasonably well on
issues of free expression while legislatures performed badly, and that, in
the same period, legislatures did a very good job of promoting income security. We would then have to identify some ranking and weighting scheme
so that we could determine which institution operated better overall. To use
a single-institution example, suppose the Supreme Court got a minor First
Amendment question "right" while failing to invalidate a massive denial of
racial equality. We could say that the Court operated badly, or well, only if
we had some measure of relative importance. Now add the necessary comparative institutional focus, and the analysis becomes even more complex. 49 Suppose Congress enacts a relatively minor statute that violates
principles of free expression (as we understand them), 50 and at the same
time enacts a large-scale program enhancing income security. The First
Amendment violation has to reduce the "goodness" we attribute to Con48. This is not a frivolous proposition. For the view from a generation or so ago, see Frank I.
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969).
49. Many of the examples in Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, are non-comparative: one
could couple massive resistance with the Supreme Court's abdication of the job of enforcing its desegregation decisions until after Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, for example. Notably, popular mobilizations during the period included the civil rights movement, which Powe mentions, id. at 893, but does not seem to count in his consequentialist evaluation of
popular constitutionalism, and resulted in legislative action that preceded serious judicial efforts to
desegregate Southern schools.
50. My current example is the federal mushroom advertising program held unconstitutional in
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
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gress because of the income-security legislation. Now we have to compare
the imperfect operation of the courts with the imperfect operation of Congress.5 1
Finally, it bears emphasizing that we have to develop arguments for
what goes on the list as a constitutional provision, for the rankings we give
the items on the list, and for the weights we assign to particular actions and
52
inactions. These are going to be arguments in substantive political theory.
It is quite unlikely that we will find substantial agreement among scholars
about the list, ranking, and weights, given the existence of real disagree53
ments about substantive political theory.
Needless to say, no one really tries to do a serious comparison of institutions as they actually operate. I have already pointed out that popular
constitutionalism includes a range of institutional interactions. Focusing
solely on "mobs," and within the category of mobs, only on those that can
fairly be characterized as threatening anarchy, is at best the first step in an
analysis of popular constitutionalism's consequences, as compared to the
consequences of judicial supremacy. That example suggests to me that
what we see in purported comparative evaluations of popular constitutional
and judicial supremacy are disagreements about substantive political
theory.
CONCLUSION

The idea of something that is simultaneously law and political is obviously unfamiliar to U.S. constitutional theorists today, as the pervasive
expressions of puzzlement about Kramer's meaning demonstrate. It was
not unfamiliar in earlier times, as Kramer shows in some detail. He also
sketches an account of how it became unfamiliar, but providing the details
of that account was not part of the charge he took upon himself. We do
know how he would tell the story. He would not give us an analysis of concepts associated with judicial review, or of the coherence of a "footnote
four" jurisprudence. He would--or at least I would-tell a story about poli-

51. Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 893 ("[T]he Supreme Court has been reasonably
good on the upside and nowhere near as bad [as 'mass movements of the twentieth century that have set
themselves out to overturn an existing legal order'] on the downside."), has the correct form an evaluation should take. Unfortunately, the analysis is not supported in an otherwise quite heavily footnoted
essay, except by references to fascism and communism that seem to me inapposite to an analysis predicated on U.S. constitutional experience (and, with respect to Russian communism, inapposite as an
example of a popular movement).
52. And not, I emphasize, an exercise in the analytic philosophy of law.
53. For example, my claim that we interpret the Constitution by the retrospective construction of
an understanding of our national identify is clearly a contestable position in political theory.
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tics operating in real historical time. Its main line would, I think, be about
how Democrats first and then Republicans found political advantage in
supporting judicial supremacy, and how those commitments persisted even
as, or perhaps because, the outcomes the Supreme Court was producing
were inconsistent with the substantive policies Democrats (mostly) and
Republicans (to some extent) sought to advance. 54 In short, it would be an
argument about constitutional theory made by means of a historical analysis of constitutional politics-as is The People Themselves.

54. This is not the forum for me to offer the story I would tell, but hints can be found throughout
TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, supra note 20.

